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THE RIGHT TO PARENTHOOD AND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: A PERSPECTIVE ON
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD IN JEWISH AND
ISRAELI LAW
PINHAS SHIFMAN*
"Give me children or else I die ... Behold, my maid Bilhah, go
in unto her; that she may bear upon my knees, and I also may
obtain children by her." Genesis 30:1,3
INTRODUCTION
This article will address the attitude of Jewish and Israeli
law with regard to the legal and moral issues raised by the prac-
tice of surrogate motherhood. At the outset, it should be empha-
sized that the term "surrogate mother" is a misnomer. As em-
ployed in legal literature,' a surrogate mother is a woman who
produces a child for a couple' by becoming artificially impreg-
nated, carrying the fetus to term, and surrendering all parental
rights to the child upon birth. However, since she is actually the
biological mother of the child,3 a more precise label would be
* Associate Professor, Family Law and Succession Law, Faculty of Law, Hebrew Uni-
versity of Jerusalem.
The New York Law School Human Rights Annual acknowledges the invaluable as-
sistance of Rabbi Rubin Porcelan, Reference Librarian at the Jewish Theological Insti-
tute, for providing us with some of the sources cited by the author.
1. A great deal has been written on the legal issues raised by surrogate motherhood,
even before the current controversy over Baby M. See, e.g., Note, Contracts to Bear a
Child, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 611 (1978)[hereinafter "Note, Contracts to Bear a Child"];
Black, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373 (1981); Wald-
ington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465 (1983);
Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96
YALE L.J. 187 (1986)[hereinafter "Stumpf"].
2. This article will attempt to deal only with agreements between a married couple
and a surrogate mother. This assumption, of course, does not preclude the possibility
that such an agreement can be initiated by an individual, a homosexual couple, or an
unmarried couple, and in dealing with existing cases these situations do arise. See infra
note 40.
3. This study does not include the possibility of in vitro fertilization in which an egg
is taken from the husband's wife, fertilized by the husband's semen, and implanted in
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"surrogate wife," because she performs the procreative function
for the husband of the adoptive couple in the place of his legal
wife. The change in terminology is not mere semantics, because
it directs our attention to the fact that surrogate motherhood is
not new to the 1980s, but instead existed as far back as biblical
times. In that era, however, the surrogate mother was legally
wed, prior to engaging in intimate relations, in addition to the
sterile wife, unlike today's surrogate mothers whose contractual
status is temporary, not sacred.
Following an examination of the religious duty of procrea-
tion, which might sanction the practice of surrogate motherhood,
this study will focus upon the legal problems in Israeli law for
determining the status of a child conceived through such meth-
ods. Israeli law, while built upon religious principles of marriage
and divorce,4 does not necessarily follow religious law in issues of
public policy.5 Even if the practice of surrogate motherhood is
not repugnant from a religious perspective, it must still be scru-
tinized from a secular point of view.
THE RELIGIOUS DUTY TO PROCREATE: SURROGATE MOTHER OR
SURROGATE WIFE?
Biblical Law
Marriage in ancient Israel was polygamous. In addition,
concubinage also existed. Accordingly, high birthrates were as-
sured and marital sterility was not a problem.
Sarah, Abraham's wife, had borne him no children. She gave
her servant maid, Hagar, to Abraham: "Behold now, God hath
restrained me from bearing, go in, I pray thee, unto my hand-
maid it may be that I shall obtain children by her. And Abra-
ham hearkened to the voice of Sarah. And Sarah, Abraham's
wife took Hagar the Egyptian . . . and gave her to Abraham her
husband to be his wife."7 This transaction culminated in the
birth of Ismael.
the surrogate mother's womb. In this case, the surrogate mother is the gestational
mother, but not the genetic mother.
4. P. SHIFMAN, FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL (Hebrew 1984).
5. P. Shifman, Marriage and Cohabitation in Israel, i6 ISR. L. REV. 439 (1981) (citing
I. ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS LAW IN THE ISRAEL LEGAL SYSTEM 168-77 (1975)).
6. E. NEUFELD, ANCIENT HEBREW MARRIAGE LAWS 118-32 (1944).
7. Genesis 16:1-3.
[Vol. IV
JEWISH AND ISRAELI LAW
This same custom is reflected by Rachel, Jacob's wife. In
grief for her barrenness, Rachel gave Bilhah, her maid, unto Ja-
cob, saying: "Behold my maid, Bilhah, go in unto her, and that
she may bear upon my knees, and I also obtain children by
her."'
One can infer that where a barren wife "gave" her maid to
her husband for the purpose of bearing children, it was the cus-
tom for such children to be adopted by the wife of their father,
who thereby became their foster mother. The concubine there-
upon relinquished all rights to the child, who became the legal
child of the foster mother according to law. Hence, it was Rachel
who gave the names Dan and Naphtali to the two sons born to
Bilhah from Jacob.9 "When Leah saw that she had left bearing,
she took Zilpah, her maid, and gave her to Jacob to wife" 1 and
Leah named the two sons borne by Zilpah.
Adoption by the legal wife did not protect the child from
abuse. After Hagar conceived, she became contemptuous of Sa-
rah who, in turn, abused her. After Sarah had borne Isaac, she
demanded the expulsion of Hagar and her son. Abraham reluc-
tantly banished Hagar to the desert where she and Ishmael were
saved from death by divine intervention." Later, Abraham dis-
inherited Ishmael; he gave his entire estate to Isaac while the
sons of his concubines received only token gifts and were sent
away.12 In the case of Jacob, however, there was no discrimina-
tion between the children of his wives and those of his concu-
bines; together, they were the progenitors of the twelve tribes of
Israel.
The biblical tradition reflected in these legends illustrates a
striking similarity to the general practice of other nations at that
time. The Patriarchs lived in the region of Harran, where the
custom of concubinage was also practiced, and whereby the wife,
if childless, had to provide her husband with a handmaid in or-
der to bear children. This custom provided that the master's
wife would have authority over the child of the maidservant, in
conformity with Abraham's practice regarding Hagar and Ish-
8. Genesis 30:3-4.
9. Genesis 30:6-8.
10. Genesis 30:9-13. The children were named Gad and Asher.




mael.13 The practice followed that of other nations of the Near
East.
Talmudic and Post-Talmudic Law
Talmudic law adduced the biblical precedent of Abraham.
Sarah gave Hagar "to Abram her husband for a wife," in order
that a child be born "after ten years.' 1 4 Under the Talmud, if a
man marries a woman who fails to give birth within ten years, he
must take additional steps to fulfill his duty of procreation.' 5 He
is required either to divorce her or to take a second wife. '6 Po-
lygamy, as well as divorcing one's wife against her will, was pro-
hibited by the eleventh century ban of Rabbi Gershom.17 Under
appropriate circumstances, however, a man could obtain special
dispensation permitting him to take a second wife. 8 Such a re-
lease would be justified where, due to his wife's sterility, the
husband is prevented from fulfilling the commandment to "be
fruitful and multiply."'19 In such a case, the husband, in theory,
is not only permitted, but obligated, to take a second wife in
order to fulfill this commandment.
In practice, however, many scholars opposed the bigamous
solution to the problem of childlessness, contending that the re-
ligious duty to procreate should yield to the need to maintain
happiness and harmony in marital relations.2 In one case, a man
was advised to remain with his barren wife and compensate for
not procreating by raising an orphan in his home.2'
On one occasion, the concept of a surrogate wife was real-
ized in a different way; it was suggested that the man tempora-
13. E. NEUFELD, supra note 6, at 130-32; 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 1287-88.
14. Genesis 16:3,
15. Yevamot 64a.
16. Id. Rashi (R. Solomon Yitzhaki, d. 1105).
17. D. FELDMAN, BIRTH CONTROL IN JEWISH LAW 37-41 (1968)[hereinafter "D.
FELDMAN"].
18. Id. at 40-45.
19. According to Jewish Law, the commandment to procreate had been originally im-
posed upon men only. On the logic of this position, see D. FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 53-
56. On the ramifications of this commandment in terms of the liberty of women to use
contraceptives, see R. BIALE, WOMEN AND JEWISH LAW 198-218 (1984).
20. D. FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 41-45.
21. Responsa Big'dei Khuna (Fiorda 1807), Even Hatzer, No.1 cited in Pit'hey
T'shuvah (Abraham Zvi Eisenstadt, d.1868), Commentary to the shulanm Arukh, Even
Hatzer, No. 154, sec.(27); D. FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 45.
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rily divorce his wife and marry another woman conditionally for
as long as was necessary to have children, then return to his first
wife.22 In practice, the idea that a childless marriage should be
dissolved unconditionally had been limited to circumstances of
marital rift. Conversely, the ideal of domestic peace and the un-
desirability of divorce justified, the continuation of a marriage
despite the presumed primacy of procreation as one of the objec-
tives of marriage.
In the State of Israel, bigamy is prohibited by secular law.23
Rabbinical authorities may, however, permit a person to take a
second wife in exceptional circumstances. Upon the granting of
such permission, the secular criminal penalties for bigamy no
longer apply.24 In one case, the Chief Rabbi refused a request
made by a husband to allow him to marry a second wife in spite
of the fact that the infertile first wife had consented to her hus-
band's request. The High Court of Justice refused to interfere
with the Chief Rabbi's interpretation of Jewish law which pre-
cluded bigamous marriage.2 5 The biblical acceptance of a surro-
gate mother gave the woman the status of a surrogate wife; a
status which is no longer available under modern laws prohibit-
ing bigamy.
The use of extramarital relations in order to fulfill one's re-
ligious duty to procreate is strictly forbidden by Jewish law.
Would the result be different if the man had no sexual relation-
ship with the mother who became impregnated by artificial in-
semination? In order to answer this question, one must first con-
sider the general attitude of Jewish law toward artificial
insemination.
Artificial insemination with the semen of a third-party do-
nor is considered by most rabbinic opinions to be both repug-
nant and contrary to Jewish ethics for a variety of reasons, par-
ticularly the possibility of incest and the difficulty in tracing the
child's genealogy.20 Where the risk of incest is minimal, some
22. Responsa Me'il Tz'dakah, No.33, by R. Jonah Landsofer of Prague (d.1712); D.
FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 42.
23. See Shifman, The English Law of Bigamy in a Multi-Confessional Society: The
Israeli Experience, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 79 (1977).
24. P. SHIFMAN, supra note 4, at 178-80.
25. Beeton v. The Chief Rabbi, 30(1) P.D. 309 (High Court 1975).
26. See Shifman, Paternity of Children Born of Artificial Insemination, 10 Mishpa-
tim 63 (Hebrew)(1981); F. ROSNER, MODERN MEDICINE AND JEWISH LAW-STUDIES IN To-
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scholars approve of artificial insemination in order to preserve
marital harmony and family integrity. If the surrogate mother is
married, rabbinic opinion opposes the surrogacy arrangement,
on the ground that it could lead to incest and doubts as to the
identity of the father who is presumed to be the woman's hus-
band. Moreover, some scholars hold that the implantation of a
married woman with semen from a man other than her husband
is tantamount to adultery.
Limitation of surrogate motherhood to unmarried women
would minimize formal religious doubts as to the propriety of
this practice. The identity of the father does not lie in doubt
and an unmarried woman cannot be an adulteress. By artificial
insemination of the surrogate mother, the man is fulfilling his
duty to "be fruitful and multiply," without engaging in illicit re-
lations. If this argument is correct, the procurement of a surro-
gate mother would be looked upon as a religious duty!
The difficulty lies, however, in the fact that the issue of the
legitimacy of surrogate motherhood cannot be resolved on for-
mal, technical grounds alone. Permitting such an arrangement
creates a discrepancy between marriage and procreation which
in the long run could lead to sexual permissiveness and disinte-
gration of the family. Although rabbinic opinion has not yet ad-
dressed itself to the religious problems created by surrogate
motherhood, several conclusions can be drawn from the parallel
debate on test-tube babies. Rabbi Waldenberg believes this
RAH JUDAISM 89-106 (1972); Drori, Artificial Insemination: Is it Adultery?, in JEWISH
LAW AND CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 203 (N. Rakover ed. 1984).
27. The commentators based themselves mainly upon the prohibition contained in
the verse in Lev. 18:20:
"And thou shalt not implant thy seed into thy neighbour's wife, to defile thyself
with her." There are some who hold that adultery is prohibited because of the
fear that the uncertainty surrounding the child of an adulterous union and the
resultant confusion could lead to incest. Thus, in the above verse, they empha-
size the words "and thou shalt not implant thy seed" and consider it to be adul-
tery when a strange man implants his semen in a married woman, even though
sexual intercourse has not taken place. Another approach stresses that the pro-
hibition falls upon the desire to be implanted with strange semen, even without
sexual intercourse, and as such, it is not sexual relations which are prohib-
ited-as in the case of incest-but rather the implantation of seed.
An opposite approach regards sexual relations as being the basis for the pro-
hibition of adultery, and therefore interprets the verse to contain a prohibition
on "lying carnally."
Drori, supra note 26, at 204-06 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. IV
JEWISH AND ISRAELI LAW
technique to be strictly forbidden because a man cannot fulfill
his duty "to be fruitful and multiply" by any means other than
sexual intercourse.2 Rabbi Neventzal, who disagrees with this
line of reasoning, expresses the view that the mere fact that a
child had been conceived by artificial techniques does not lessen
the value of a man fulfilling his duty of procreation. On the con-
trary, Rabbi Neventzal believes that the prohibition of test-tube
conception techniques denies the husband the opportunity to
fulfill his duty to procreate and might precipitate a serious chal-
lenge to marital harmony.2 9
Unfortunately, allowing a husband to fulfill his duty to pro-
create by the use of a surrogate wife does not resolve the funda-
mental question: Can the father deny the parental rights of the
child's biological mother?
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES UNDER ISRAELI LAW
Biological Parenthood and Social Parenthood
One of the main issues to be resolved in the context of sur-
rogate motherhood is who are the legal parents of the child.
Fundamental concepts of Jewish and Israeli law which define le-
gal parenthood conflict with modern legal theories which claim
that the mentally conceiving parents have rights superior to all
other parties.3
Traditional Jewish and Israeli law do not recognize the con-
cept of an illegitimate child; children born in or out of wedlock
are treated equally. Furthermore, unmarried parents are not, in
principle, denied any rights toward their children. The factual,
biological relationship is a sufficient basis for vesting parental
28. SEFER ASIA 84-92 (Hebrew 1976). See also JEWISH MEDICAL LAW 106-10 (A. Stein-
berg M.D. ed., D. Simons M.D. trans. 1980).
29. Sefer Asia at 92-93.
30. See, e.g., Stumpf, supra note 1, at 207:
Especially in situations where both the initiating parents and the surrogate
mother want the child, case-by-case determinations of which set of parents
might provide the best home environment would be unnecessarily intrusive and
arbitrary. In surrogate parenting cases, the initiating parents should be the des-
ignated legal parents with sustained rights to the child. Indeed, in most cases of
procreative collaboration, the parties will agree-and the legal presumptions





rights, and the fact that the parent is unmarried does not by
itself derogate his or her parental rights if he or she is willing to
take responsibility for the child." It seems that the encounter of
the courts with artificial insemination and other new reproduc-
tive technologies necessitates a change in the traditional defini-
tion of parenthood from a purely biological definition to a so-
cially oriented one.
Although many scholars of Jewish law are reluctant to rec-
ommend the use of new reproductive technologies, modern Is-
raeli secular law has taken no stand as to their morality. The
emerging viewpoint of Israeli law seems to be that upon the ac-
tual birth of a child to a surrogate mother, the best interests of
the child must be the primary concern since the child bears no
responsibility for the manner in which it was conceived. Fur-
thermore, Israeli law will likely adopt the viewpoint that in a
modern state, society should not be allowed to interfere in inti-
mate matters of procreation by regulating reproductive technol-
ogy. According to this view, the couple's decision is a personal
one, based on their right to privacy, and must not be exposed to
state interference. The first decision of the Israeli Supreme
Court concerning Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID) re-
sulted in recognition of the legality of an agreement between
spouses concerning the performance of artificial insemination.2
By recognizing the agreement and regarding it as imposing upon
the husband the duty to support the child, the court has
adopted by implication an approach which does not condemn, a
priori, artificial insemination from a donor to a married woman
whose husband gives his full consent to the act. This inference is
important as a signal that the court ignored the attitude of most
religious scholars to AID. 3
The process which produced the present state of the law on
AID in the United States may eventually emerge in Israel. In
the United States the first step in the positive recognition of
AID was taken on the basis of contract law. 4 Later, the idea was
31. P. Shifman, The Status of the Unmarried Parent in Israel Law, 12 IsE. L. REV.
194 (1977).
32. Salma v. Salma, 34(2) P.D. 779 (Civ. App. 1980).
33. P. Shifman, First Encounter of Israeli Law with Artificial Insemination, 16 ISR.
L. REV. 250 (1981).
34. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1963).
[Vol. IV
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formulated and institutionalized in case law 5 and legislations6
that a husband who consented to artificial insemination should
bear the unequivocal status of father even without reliance on
implied contract theory." While the general legal doctrine be-
hind this rule does not totally replace the idea of biological
parenthood with consensual parenthood, the mere fact that the
wife was fertilized through artificial insemination is not decisive.
There is no dispute that where Artificial Insemination by Hus-
band (AIH) is performed the husband is the father of the child
although the wife's pregnancy was the result of artificial insemi-
nation. Conversely, the mere fact that a person gave his con-
sent to take parental responsibility for a child does not grant
him the status of parent to the child. If, for instance, a husband
gave his consent to sexual relations between his wife and an-
other man, he would not be considered, on the basis of his con-
The court found that Mrs. Gursky was induced by her husband's consent to be artifi-
cially inseminated and thus relied to her detriment upon her husband's wishes. The
court chose to invoke the contract doctrine of equitable estoppel and found Mr. Gursky
primarily liable for support of the child. 39 Misc.2d at 1088-89, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 412; Cf.
In re Karin T. v. Michael T., 127 Misc. 2d 14, 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fain. Ct. 1985) (con-
tract entered into by respondent-a woman who attempted to change her feminine iden-
tity and live and act like a man and a father-with the mother and the doctor must
inure to the benefit of the children); R.S. v. R.S., 9 Kan. App. 39, 670 P.2d 923 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1983) (The court held that a husband who consents to his wife being artificially
inseminated is estopped from denying that he is the father of the child and has thus,
impliedly agreed to support the child).
35. People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968); In re
Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. Kings Co. 1973).
36. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West
Supp. 1980).
37. See People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 498-99, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10-
11 (1968). This case involved statutory construction of § 270 of the California Penal
Code. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1983). In controversy was the definition of the term
"father." The court found the determinative factor was not limited to traditional con-
cepts of a biological or natural father, but rather whether there exists the legal relation-
ship of father and child. The court reasoned that it would be unfair to consider an anon-
ymous donor of sperm as the "natural father," as he is "no more responsible for the use
made of his sperm than is the donor of blood or a kidney." See also In re Adoption of
Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 105, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 435-36 (Sur. Ct. Kings Co. 1973)
(The court held that a child born of consensual artificial insemination during a valid
marriage is a legitimate child entitled to the same rights of a naturally conceived child.)
38. The courts might, however, rule otherwise regarding AIH that took place after
the death of the husband. If a wife was impregnated with semen deposited by her late
husband in a sperm bank, it is submitted that the child could not legally be considered
his son, since he did not take an active role in conception.
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL [Vol. IV
sent, to be the father of the child conceived in that situation. 9
Why, then, is a child conceived by AID deemed to be the child
of the mother's husband, rather than the donor who supplied
the semen for his conception? In the context of surrogate moth-
erhood, the donor of the egg parallels the sperm donor in AID
who consented in advance to relinquish all parental rights to the
child.
To evaluate this problem, compare the case of a single wo-
man using semen donated by a friend with the typical situation
of a married couple employing AID. As to the former situation, a
New Jersey court ruled that the friend who donates semen was
the natural father of the child."' The court held that it is in the
child's best interest to have two parents whenever possible and,
therefore, no distinction should be made between natural and
artificial conception."1
The result presumably would have been different if the se-
men came from an anonymous donor.42 In the New Jersey case,
39. See In re Marriage of L.M.S. v. S.L.S., 105 Wisc. 2d 118, 312 N.W. 2d 853 (1981)
(a husband who consented to having his wife impregnated through sexual relations with
a surrogate father, has the legal duties and responsibilities of fatherhood, including sup-
port); In re Adoption of McFadyen, 108 Ill. App. 3d 329, 438 N.E. 2d 1362 (1982), cert.
denied 460 U.S. 1015 (1983) (presumption of husband that he was the biological father
of the child born to his wife was rebutted where the husband had a vasectomy and wife
had relations with other men).
40. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Juv. & Dom. Rel Ct. 1977). A
donor of semen, which was used by an unmarried woman to artificially inseminate her-
self, sued to obtain visitation rights to the child born as a direct result of the artificial
insemination. The court found the anonymity of the sperm donor to be the dispositive
factor. By donating his semen anonymously, the donor impliedly gives it without taking
on such responsibilities for its use. In such a situation, the person who consents to the
use of the sperm, not his own, is responsible for fathering the child. For example, when a
husband consents to his wife's artificial insemination from an anonymous donor, he takes
upon himself the responsibilities of fatherhood. Id. at 167, 377 A.2d at 824. But in this
case, the donee received the semen from a friend, someone she knew and dated for two
years. This friend intended to assume the responsibilities of parenthood when the child
was conceived. Therefore, because of his consent and active participation in the proce-
dure leading to conception, he will be treated as the natural father of the child and will
be entitled to visitation rights. Id. at 166-68, 377 A.2d at 824-25.
41. The court took no position as to the propriety of the artificial insemination be-
tween unmarried persons. It was concerned only with the best interests of the child in
granting custody or visitation. For such consideration, the court will not make any dis-
tinction between a child conceived naturally or artificially. Id. at 166-67, 377 A.2d at 824-
25.
42. By donating his semen anonymously, the donor impliedly gives it without taking
on such responsibilities for its use. Id. at 167, 377 A.2d at 824.
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the donor's active participation in the procedure leading to con-
ception was cited as the basis of placing the responsibilities of
fatherhood upon him.'" An anonymous donor to a married
couple, on the other hand, has no direct contact with the proce-
dure or the mother. Although he is the biological father, he may
not assert any rights with regard to a child born through the use
of his semen because he did not consciously participate in the
child's conception.4 Although he supplied semen and placed it
at the disposal of the doctor, the decision became the doctor's
whether to use this semen, if at all, and if used, with which wo-
man."'5 The wife's husband, who actively participates in and con-
sents to his wife's artificial insemination, will be treated as the
child's legal father, instead of the donor who has relinquished
control over the procreational use of his sperm. Surprisingly,
some Jewish law scholars support this view."'
In brief, the general test under American law of the status
of a parent is whether he actively participated in the child's con-
ception, regardless of whether that conception took place artifi-
cially or naturally. When applying this test to a case involving
surrogate motherhood, both genetic parents of the child, namely
the husband and the surrogate mother, actively participated in
the conception of the child: the husband by supplying his sperm,
and the surrogate mother by supplying an egg, becoming im-
pregnating, and carrying the fetus to term. While the husband's
wife may assume a prominent role in the various stages leading
to the birth of the child, and even take the initiative in seeking a
43. "C.M.'s consent and active participation in the procedure leading to conception
should place upon him the responsibilities of fatherhood," Id. at 168, 377 A.2d at 825.
44. "[A] child conceived through heterologous artificial insemination does not have a
"natural father," as the term is commonly used. The anonymous donor of the sperm
cannot be considered the "natural father," as he is no more responsible for the use made
of his sperm than is the donor of blood or a kidney. . . With the use of the frozen semen,
the donor may even be dead at the time the semen is used." Id. at 164, 377 A.2d at 823.
(quoting People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10, 437 P.2d 495, 498 (1968).
45. By statute in California a "donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for
use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as
if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived." CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005,
subd. (b). In Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (1986)
(because Mary did not obtain Jhordan's semen through a licensed physician, and be-
cause the parties by all other conduct presented Jhordan's status as a member of the
family, the court held Jhordan to be the baby's legal father).
46. Rosner, supra note 26, at 98-99.
1987]
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surrogate mother, this does not automatically guarantee her sta-
tus as the child's mother, since another woman, who is the bio-
logical mother, was so directly involved in the child's conception
and birth. In other words, despite the tendency of courts and
legislators to accommodate the needs of people trying to realize
their right to parenthood through recent reproductive technolo-
gies, biological motherhood is still the starting point in the legal
definition of parenthood.
All legislation on these matters must begin with a general
theory of parenthood. Statutes have been enacted in many
states in the United States in attempts to solve the legal
problems of AID. Their scope, however, is generally limited to
those situations where a married couple agrees to artificial in-
semination. By addressing one specific set of facts, these laws
have not retained the flexibility required to address various situ-
ations. The provision that "the donor of semen provided. . . for
use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's
wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a
child thereby conceived, '4 7 was clearly aimed at absolving do-
nors of legal responsibility for children born as a result of the
use of their smen. Ironically, by applying this provision to the
situation of surrogate motherhood, although the child is biologi-
cally the husband's, proof of paternity becomes virtually impos-
sible.48 The husband as well as the surrogate mother should be
considered the child's parents inasmuch as both actively partici-
pate in the conception.
Waiver of Parental Rights by the Surrogate Mother
Assuming that, ex definitio, the surrogate mother is the le-
gal mother of the child, what is the value of her waiver of paren-
tal rights and her advance consent to surrender the child for
adoption by the husband's wife?
A distinction should be made between two different con-
cepts in a surrogate motherhood contract: the agreement of the
surrogate mother and the husband to produce a child; and the
agreement of the surrogate mother to surrender the child and
47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1983); see also 41 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b), 9A
U.L.A. 593 (1973).
48. Note, Contracts to Bear a Child, supra note 1, at 614.
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her parental rights to the child. The agreement of the surrogate
mother and the husband to produce a child will not likely be
treated as repugnant to public policy in Israel where both the
civil right to privacy and the religious duty to procreate coincide
and the strong economic incentive of the surrogate mother to
cooperate with the couple does not render the agreement im-
moral exploitation. On the other hand, payment given to the
surrogate mother in exchange for releasing the child for adop-
tion will likely invoke the criminal law against the sale of babies.
The Israeli Adoption of Children Law, 1981, provides that "[a]
person who otherwise by permission of the court, offers or gives,
or requests or accepts, any consideration in money or money's
worth for an adoption ... is liable to imprisonment for three
years.
4 9
Nevertheless, surrogate motherhood is not necessarily pro-
hibited by this provision inasmuch as it does not forbid payment
for services rendered. The mother's consent to surrender the
child for adoption may be invalidated, however, by a court on
her application on the ground that it had been given before the
birth of the child.50 She would not be bound under Israeli law by
her undertaking since, under the Supreme Court ruling, an
agreement between parents that their child will not be recog-
nized as the child of both parents has no validity.5
1
If the surrogate mother changes her mind and refuses to
surrender the child, the court will be called upon to decide the
custody dispute by determining the best interests of the child.
Israeli law espouses the tender-years doctrine which gives the
natural mother custodial preference concerning children up to
six years of age unless there are special reasons to rule other-
wise.5' Grounds for paternal custody for a child under six years
of age can be found if the father can raise the child in a two-
parent family.
In the absence of lengthy post-natal bonding between
mother and child, the psychological attachments of the infant
are far more difficult to determine, thus frustrating predictions
49. Section 32, Penal Law, 1977, section 364, prohibits relinquishing the custody of a
minor for profit.
50. Adoption of Children Law, 1981, section 10.
51. Merhav v. Sharleen, 26(1) P.D. 701, 704 (Civ. App. 1972).
52. Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, 1962, section 3.
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of best interests.53 In such a case, the court should do justice
between the parties. Optimally, legal custody should be granted
to the adoptive couple, because they have no other chance to
realize their right to parenthood.5 4 While the agreement is le-
gally void if the natural mother refuses to surrender the child, it
still retains moral weight. The best interests of the child require
that the court be guided by moral directives. The emotional
trauma of a custody suit may cause more harm to the child than
good from placement of the child with the more appropriate
parent. The tender-years doctrine favoring the natural mother is
a simple solution which disregards the fitness of any of the par-
ties as parents. A presumption in favor of the adopting
couple-the biological father and adopting mother-based on
the surrogacy agreement, is also simplistic but ensures that the
child will have a two-parent family. This final doctrine may be
the only solution under Jewish and Israeli where the two-parent
family is the most favored situation.
53. Note, Contracts to Bear a Child, supra note 1, at 621.
54. This consideration does not apply if the motivation for the surrogate motherhood
agreement was not infertility of the husband's wife but rather her desire to avoid preg-
nancy as a matter of her own convenience. In such a case, it is submitted that no pre-
sumption of preference should be made in favor of the couple.
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